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A B S T R A C T
While second-generation biomass resources, such as agricultural residues, are crucial for the development of the
bioeconomy, value chains and markets of locally available agricultural residues remain uncommon. Current
research predominantly provides useful insights into technological or techno-economic aspects of agricultural
residue harvesting and processing, but, for investors in bio-reﬁneries, one of the main challenges remains en-
suring a continuous feedstock supply to the plant. In this article, we present the results of a mixed-method
approach, combining insights from semi-structured interviews with simulation results of an agent-based model.
This model simulates the decisions of individual economic actors in the value chain – including farmers, custom
harvesters and one processor – under four coordination scenarios (direct sale, a custom harvester, mediated
contract and two cooperative structures). Our results provide useful insights in the way diﬀerent factors inﬂu-
ence the ability to ensure a continuous feedstock supply. We ﬁnd that besides actors' willingness, actors' co-
ordination and supply reliability, also actors' actual participation and economic context play a crucial role.
Furthermore, we are able to demonstrate the complex interplay between these factors. Our ﬁndings are relevant
to guide successful future development of agricultural residue value chains for the bioeconomy.
1. Introduction
The use of agricultural residues will be crucial to realize the shift
from a fuel-based economies towards a biobased economies. These
second-generation biomass resources are of special interest in Europe
given the ongoing food-versus-fuel debate. It was recently estimated
that about 84.6 million tonnes (dry matter) agricultural residue could
be sustainably harvested and used yearly in Europe [1]. However,
looking to reality, their actual use for the production of materials and
energy remains limited. Indeed, as long as a continuous feedstock
supply cannot be guaranteed, large investments in agricultural residue
processing facilities will remain unlikely. As stated by Gold and Suering
(2011), biomass sourcing is “a crucial and, at the same time, vulnerable
activity” [2]. In this article, we explore the diﬀerent inﬂuencing factors
that contribute to ensure a continuous agricultural residue supply, and
how these factors inﬂuence each other. In this way, we provide insights
in why local agricultural residue value chains remain uncommon,
which may encourage their development in the future.
1.1. Research rationale
Current research to advance the use of agricultural residues pre-
dominantly provides useful insights into technological and techno-
economic aspects of their harvest, logistics and processing. In com-
parison, however, relatively limited eﬀort is spent to address the or-
ganizational challenges associated with agricultural residue value chain
development. This is surprising, as the speciﬁc characteristics of local
agricultural value chains demand special attention for their organiza-
tion. First, due to the seasonal nature, large storage areas are needed
[3–6] and equipment and workforce is concentrated in time, which can
lead to ineﬃcient use of resources [3]. Second, agricultural residues
often require customized equipment for collection and handling, which
further complicates the structure of the value chain [3]. Thirdly, agri-
cultural residues generally have low bulk density and high moisture
content, leading to high collection, handling and transportation costs
[2–4,6]. Therefore, agricultural residue value chains are usually very
local, having a typical 80–100 km (km) radius of collection [7].
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Besides these unique characteristics of biomass, agricultural residue
value chains are also inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the economic
agents involved. Indeed, these by-products are produced by a large
number of farmers dispersed within the collection area of a relatively
small number of processors, which increases transportation and hand-
ling costs [4–6]. Moreover, farmers are usually not only driven by ra-
tional economic goals. Other social aspects may play a role [8], in-
cluding risk aversion or the tendency towards conservatism.
Furthermore, farmers operate within a context and network of other
economic agents, including custom harvesters. Finally, the biomass
sector is characterized by a highly variable economic environment be-
cause of ﬂuctuations in fossil fuel prices, and changing agronomic
conditions and technological factors. Therefore, it is challenging, if not
impossible, to create contracts that prevent opportunistic behavior [9].
As a result of these unique characteristics of both the biomass itself
and the economic agents involved in biomass value chains, establishing
a bioeconomy and developing new agricultural residue value chains
will take more than the mere introduction of new or advanced tech-
nologies [10]. Furthermore, simply copying the organizational struc-
ture of other value chains is not feasible in most cases. Therefore, it is
crucial that key stakeholders, investors, and policy makers have an
adequate understanding of inﬂuencing factors that drive the challenges
associated with agricultural residue value chains.
1.2. Inﬂuencing factors ensuring constant feedstock supply
According to literature, biomass value chains have two main chal-
lenges [2]. First, it is compulsory to keep the biomass input costs under
control, as they often are about 50% of the total costs [2], second, a
constant feedstock supply to the plant [2,11] is needed. In this article,
we focus on the second aspect. Indeed, given the large volumes of
biomass required in bio-reﬁneries, they are very vulnerable to an un-
stable supply [12,13]. As such, biomass sourcing is one of their most
important activities. According to literature, this continuous supply
depends on: (1) the willingness of the actors to participate, (2) the re-
liability of supply and (3) the coordination of the actors involved in the
value chain [2,14] (Fig. 1).
Previous research on the factors inﬂuencing a continuous feedstock
supply mainly provided a qualitative perspective. The ﬁrst factor, the
willingness of the actors to participate, was investigated by qualita-
tively assessing the organizational preferences and/or perspectives of
producers on biomass supply either through surveys or semi-structured
interviews [15–17]. The second factor, the reliability of supply, was
discussed by Ref. [18] who presented a theoretical framework for
biomass production contract development in order to “improve contract
negotiation processes and improve supply chain stability”. Recently,
also the eﬀectiveness of a business plan as a tool to manage several
uncertainties in new and innovative ﬁrms within the context of the
bioeconomy was investigated [19]. The third factor, namely the co-
ordination of the actors involved in the value chain, was predominantly
researched from the perspective of transaction cost economics [9,
20–23].
While these studies provide valuable insights in how these three
factors inﬂuence the goal of ensuring a continuous supply, they treat
each of them separately. Furthermore, they remain mainly descriptive,
static and use a qualitative approach to assess the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
actors' coordination scenarios on the biomass value chain. In this ar-
ticle, we aim to integrate these three factors and to see whether addi-
tional factors also play a role. Furthermore, we investigate how they
inﬂuence each other and can help in reaching the goal of ensuring a
continuous agricultural residue supply, while also taking into account
the innovation diﬀusion process and market dynamics.
1.3. Case-study: the corn stover value chain in Flanders
In order to make our work tangible, we focus on the case-study of
corn stover in Flanders, the northern region of Belgium. In this region, it
was estimated that yearly about 400,000Mg (dry mass) of corn stover
remains lying on the ﬁelds after harvest of the corn grain. This corn
stover could potentially be used for feed [24–26], combustion [27],
anaerobic digestion [28,29], or to produce bioethanol [30] or cellulosic
sugars [31,32]. In order to realize this, a corn stover value chain should
be established, in which suﬃcient farmers cultivate a corn variety of
which both the grain and the stover can be harvested, and suﬃcient
custom harvesters invest in a single-pass harvester. Despite multiple
attempts to set up a corn stover value chain, this agricultural residue is
neither harvested nor processed. The case of Flanders is especially in-
teresting from an organizational perspective, as the region is char-
acterized by a relatively large number of corn producers (about 7500),
each cultivating a relatively limited number of hectares (ha)
(mean= 7.63 ha) [33]. As such, the actors' willingness to participate,
the supply reliability, and adequate coordination between the actors is
crucial for a successful value chain. Furthermore, we could wonder
whether additional inﬂuencing factors could play a role and how these
factors interact with each other.
2. Method
The goal of this research is to investigate the diﬀerent factors that
contribute to the challenge of ensuring a stable supply of corn stover to
a bio-reﬁnery. In order to realize this, we used a mixed-method ap-
proach, integrating qualitative and quantitative research methods.
According to [34], a mixed-method approach is advantageous, as it
“combines the strengths of the quantitative and qualitative methods
and compensates for their respective limitations”. More speciﬁcally, for
this research, we integrated the results from semi-structured interviews
with agent-based modelling. This modelling approach was chosen, as it
allows us to explicitly take into account the individual decisions of and
interactions between the diﬀerent stakeholders involved in the agri-
cultural residue value chain. Indeed, as indicated by Ref. [17], the in-
dividual decision making of farmers as feedstock providers is often
disregarded in oﬃcial policy documents or research. However, this
decision making is crucial. Furthermore, they state that besides eco-
nomic rational behavior, also non-economic considerations play a role
[17]. Agent-based modelling is especially suited to take these non-
economic considerations into account. In the following paragraphs, we
further discuss the two methods combined.
2.1. Qualitative data to feed the agent-based model
Between March and September 2015, we conducted 14 semi-struc-
tured interviews with diﬀerent experts and possible stakeholders of a
corn stover value chain in Flanders (Table 1). Semi-structured inter-
views are a useful way to obtain a large amount of information in a
Fig. 1. Three inﬂuencing factors determining a continuous biomass supply as found in
literature [14].
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limited amount of time [35].
All interviews were recorded, fully transcribed and thematically
analysed [36] using NVIVO 11. We used the narrative data from these
semi-structured interviews to construct the agent-based model (ABM).
This way of using qualitative data from semi-structured interviews was
also suggested by Boero and Squazzoni (2005) [37] and has been ap-
plied by multiple researchers (e.g. Refs. [38–42]). The insights from the
semi-structured interviews were complemented with a literature study
on the techno-economic aspects of corn stover harvest, logistics and
processing (e.g. Refs. [30,43–49]), and on the organizational aspects of
biomass value chains (e.g. Refs. [16,18,19,50]). From these analyses,
we were able to identify the main economic actors inﬂuencing the value
chain, and their main behavioral rules, which was needed to develop
the ABM. After a preliminary version of the model was developed, a
workshop was organized for diﬀerent experts of corn stover harvest,
logistics and processing. In this workshop, with 9 participants, the
model and the preliminary results were presented and feedback from
the participants was taken into account to build the ﬁnal model.
2.2. Agent-based modelling
The goal of ABMs is to help researchers to understand the me-
chanisms operating at the micro level of a system, in our case the value
chain, that lead to the speciﬁc features observed at the macro-level,
being the supply certainty. As such, we developed an ABM to help us
understand the factors at the micro level (e.g. actors' willingness to
participate, reliability of supply, and actors' coordination) that lead to
the challenge observed at the macro level; ensuring a continuous
feedstock supply. More speciﬁcally, the ABM presented in this article
simulated the behavior of, and interactions between, the main eco-
nomic actors inﬂuencing the value chain, identiﬁed from the semi-
structured interviews.
The advantage of agent-based modelling is that it allows researchers
to take into account the heterogeneous, bounded rational, sociological
and strategic decision-making aspects of the actors. Therefore, some
assumptions from other modelling approaches, such as economic ra-
tional behavior or equilibria can be relaxed [51,52]. Furthermore,
agent-based modelling allows the modeler to represent economic sys-
tems in a natural way [52,53].
Multiple studies have used ABMs to gain insight in market me-
chanisms of biomass value chains. For example, an ABM was used to
study the development of switch grass biofuel and bioelectrivity market
at the local level [54]. Also the adaptation of Miscanthus production by
farmers in Illinois and the impact on bioreﬁnery capacity and con-
tractual agreements was explored using an ABM, [55]. Agent-based
modelling was also used to estimate corn stover removal rates and the
transboundary eﬀect along the bioenergy value chain in Iowa [46].
Finally, an ABM was developed to assess the impact of market context
on the supply of local biomass for anaerobic digestion plants [56]. More
detailed information on ABMs can be found in Refs. [52,53,57]. We
Table 1
Overview of the respondents interviewed.
Function # Respondents
Farmer 3
Representative farmers' organization 1
Custom harvester 4
Representative from industry 3
Policy maker 1
Researcher 2
Total 14
Fig. 2. Schematic overview of the ABM. Three main agents were identiﬁed (a cellulosic sugar production plant, custom harvesters and farmers) and included in the model. Their main
characteristics are presented in the colored boxes. The dashed rectangle represents the model boundary. Parameters mentioned outside the model boundary are exogenous to the model
and derived from literature.
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developed our model in R [58].
3. General model description
This section brieﬂy describes the main structure of the ABM we
developed. As we do not have the space, nor the intention to explain the
full details of the model in this article, readers, interested in speciﬁc
model details, can have access to a complete model description fol-
lowing the Overview, Design and Details (ODD) protocol [59,60] in the
supplemental web enabled material.
3.1. Agents
The qualitative research allowed us to identify the main actors in-
volved in a possible corn stover value in Flanders. As can be seen in
Fig. 2, three such actors were identiﬁed; farmers, custom harvesters
(CHs), and processors.
We decided to model only one processor type: a cellulosic sugar
production plant (CSPP), converting the corn stover into cellulosic su-
gars and lignin by-product. This processing option was chosen, because
during the interviews and the workshop, the respondents indicated that
a high value end product, like cellulosic sugars, would be needed for a
successful value chain, while it was indicated that the price of other
products, including bio-ethanol, would likely be too low to cover the
production, collection and processing costs. As such, we included a
CSPP in the model. Speciﬁc techno-economic data on such a plant could
be found in literature [31,32]. We assumed that the CSPP is located in
the center of the simulated area and has a maximum capacity of
250,000Mg (dry basis). We assumed that the CSPP aims to purchase
feedstock at the lowest price possible, and will not be willing to pay
more than a predeﬁned ceiled sum of 117.27 € Mg−1 [31].
Moreover, from the qualitative research, we identiﬁed custom har-
vesters (CHs) as main actors in a potential corn stover value chain in
Flanders, as they would be responsible not only for corn grain harvest,
but also corn stover harvest. Therefore, in our model, we included 180
CHs. In the model they are randomly located over the simulated area.
During the semi-structured interviews, CHs underlined the limited
harvest time for corn grain, which we explicitly included in the model
as a maximum harvest capacity of 400 ha year−1 for corn grain, and
300 ha year −1 for corn grain and corn stover, assuming a single-pass
harvesting system [61].
Finally, farmers, the corn stover producers, were identiﬁed as main
economic actors in the potential value chain. Farm data were retrieved
from the Belgian Farm Structure Survey of 2010. As such, we were able
to identify 7522 farmers that grew corn grain in 2010. From this survey,
we could identify the name of their municipality, as well as the surface
of their farmland and for which crops they used this farmland. As the
survey did not contain data on their exact location, we assumed all
farmers to be located in the center of their respective municipality. In
the model, we assumed that farmers can choose to cultivate following
crops: corn grain; corn silage; potato; wheat; temporary and permanent
grassland. We selected these crops, as 95% of the farmland cultivated
by corn farmers in Flanders is covered by them [33]. Farmers can also
choose to grow a corn variety of which both the grain and the stover
can be harvested. However, these varieties generally have a lower yield.
In the model, farmers are considered to be price-takers: they have to sell
their crops at market price, and have no inﬂuence on these prices
themselves. The model input data for these prices were the yearly
average crop prices from 2003 until 2014, following [62,63] (Fig. 3).
We observe signiﬁcant price ﬂuctuations. However, as they are derived
from statistical data, they can be considered representative.
3.2. Behavioral rules: consumat approach
The semi-structured interviews with farmers and CHs revealed that
decisions to adapt a new agricultural practice, such as corn stover
harvest, or investment decisions (e.g. decisions to invest in a single-pass
harvester) are not only based on economic criteria, like proﬁtability,
but also depend on other factors, including risk aversion, or con-
servatism to certain behavior. Therefore, we assumed that both CHs and
farmers follow the consumat approach to decide on investment deci-
sions, crop selection and allocation respectively. The consumat ap-
proach, a meta-model of human behavior, integrates insights from ex-
pert-theories on human behavior [64]. The meta-model is based on two
main principles. Firstly, people follow a satisfying behavior instead of
always making optimal decisions [65]. This can be attributed to limited
time and cognitive resources [64], meaning that people are not able to
constantly evaluate all possible options and outcomes to determine the
optimal decision [64]. Consequently, people repeat certain behaviors as
long as they are satisﬁed and, and create habits. Secondly, people ob-
serve other people's behavior and use this information to acquire
knowledge on new attractive behaviors [18,64]. Hence, people who are
uncertain about their decisions mimic the behavior of others. This be-
havior is even more prominent when decisions are complex and have
serious repercussions, such as making investments to join an innovative
value chain [18].
The consumat approach is based on two variables: economic sa-
tisfaction and uncertainty. First, in our model, economic satisfaction
can be regarded as a proxy for the answer to the question “Am I happy
with my revenue, given my current assets (e.g. arable land or ma-
chinery). In our model, the economic satisfaction is calculated as the
ratio of the agents' actual gross margin over his potential maximum
gross margin. Second, the uncertainty value is a proxy for: “How certain
am I that may cropping plan or machinery investment decisions were
good decisions, given the economic performance of the other farmers or
custom harvesters?”. In our model, the uncertainty value is calculated
as the ratio of the agents' actual gross margin over his expected gross
margin. In the supplemental web enabled material, we detail how these
two variables are calculated, for both the farmers and the CHs.
The combination of the economic satisfaction and uncertainty leads
to four behavioral rules (Fig. 4).
(1) Repetition: applied by agents that are satisﬁed with their economic
performance and certain about the decisions they make. They are
not inclined to change their behavior. Farmers keep their current
cropping plan and CHs will not consider investing in a new single-
pass harvester.
(2) Imitation: applied by agents that are satisﬁed with their economic
performance, but uncertain about their decisions. Farmers will
imitate the cropping plan of the farmer with the highest gross
margin in their close network, which are the farmers within a 10 km
radius. CHs will consider purchasing a single-pass harvester if they
have a stover harvesting contract that year and if more than half of
the CHs in their close network already did. The close network of a
CH is determined by a random Erdös-Renyi network [67], in which
each CH has a probability of 0.3 to be connected to another CH. For
each connection, we randomly sampled a weight between 0 and 1.
Links with a weight equal or larger than 0.5 represents the close
network of the CH.
(3) Social comparison: applied by agents that are unsatisﬁed from an
economic perspective and uncertain about their decisions. Farmers
will copy the cropping plan of the farmer with the highest gross
margin in their broad network, which are all farmers within the
same agro-ecological region. This behavior occurs during farmers'
networking days focusing on economic performance comparisons in
order to identify improvements. CHs will consider purchasing a
single-pass harvester if they have a stover harvesting contract that
year and if more than half of the CHs in their broad network already
did. The broad network of a CH is determined by the same Erdös-
Renyi network mentioned above. However, in this case all links
represent the broad network of the CH.
(4) Deliberation: applied by agents with a low economic satisfaction
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who are certain about their decisions. Deliberating farmers will
optimize their gross margin by optimizing their cropping plan given
current crop prices and crop rotation restrictions. Deliberating CHs
will consider purchasing a single-pass harvester if the net present
value of their investment is positive, but they will only invest if they
have a stover harvesting contract that year. In the supplemented
web enabled material, we detail how the net present value is cal-
culated.
The behavioral rule that each farmer or CH will follow is yearly
determined as follows. The agent calculates his economic satisfaction
and uncertainty value and compares it with the individually determined
threshold parameters: the aspiration level and uncertainty tolerance,
respectively. When the economic satisfaction is higher than the
aspiration level, he will either follow a repetition or imitation behavior.
Vice versa, when the economic satisfaction is lower than the aspiration
level, he will either follow a deliberation or social comparison behavior.
Similar for the uncertainty value, when the uncertainty value is higher
than the uncertainty tolerance, he will follow an imitation or social
comparison behavior. Vice-versa, when the uncertainty value is lower
than the uncertainty tolerance, he will follow an repetition or delib-
eration behavior. The aspiration level and uncertainty tolerance para-
meters are individually and randomly sampled for each farmer and CH
upon model initialization from a normal distribution with a mean value
of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.17 [66].
Fig. 3. Prices of corn grain, corn silage, potato, wheat, expressed in € Mg−1. The values of permanent and temporary grassland (dashed green line) are expressed in € ha−1. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 4. Two variables included in the consumat approach, leading to
four behavioral rules (based on [64,66]).
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3.3. Scenario analysis: comparison of four actor coordination scenarios
In order to explore how the factors identiﬁed in literature contribute
to ensuring a continuous agricultural residue supply, to investigate
whether there are additional factors, and how they interact, we applied
our ABM to four scenarios, each representing a diﬀerent level of actor
coordination (Fig. 5). While these scenarios are based on [31], they are
also discussed by other researchers (e.g. Refs. [20,23]).
The ﬁrst scenario is called “Direct sale”. In this scenario, there is
hardly any coordination of the economic actors. Farmers interested in
selling stover negotiate individually with the CSPP about the corn
stover price. They are responsible for the harvest and transportation of
the stover to the processing plant and also bear the costs of these ac-
tivities. In order to harvest their corn stover, farmers need to ﬁnd a CH
that is willing to invest or has already invested in a single-pass har-
vester. In the second scenario, called “request-for-purchase”, the eco-
nomic actors are slightly more coordinated, as the CHs act as inter-
mediaries between the farmers and the CSPP. Participating CHs
contract a certain volume of stover to be delivered to the CSPP at a
certain price. In this case, the CHs are responsible for the harvest and
transportation costs and need to look for farmers that are willing to sell
their stover. In the third scenario, called “supply cooperative”, farmers
and CHs are well coordinated and united in a cooperative organization.
The supply cooperative aims to eﬃciently organize the corn stover
harvest and logistics and negotiates as a single entity about the corn
stover supply conditions with the CSPP. Finally, in the fourth scenario,
called “bioprocessing cooperative”, all economic actors are highly co-
ordinated in a cooperative that involves farmers, CHs, and the CSPP.
The goal of the bioprocessing cooperative is to eﬃciently organize the
total corn stover value chain in such a way that each member con-
tributes to, but also shares in the proﬁt made by the CSPP. Detailed
information on how these four scenarios are implemented in the ABM
can be found in the supplemented web enabled material.
4. Results
The simulation results below present the averages of 100 runs for
each actor coordination scenario (direct sale, request-for-purchase,
supply cooperative, and bioprocessing cooperative). This number of
runs is necessary to capture stochastic eﬀects and to provide general
estimations. As the results are inﬂuenced by the historic crop prices
(2003–2014) included in the model, the results are framed in this
period. More concretely, in the section below we evaluate the eﬀect of
the coordination of actors in diﬀerent coordination scenarios on the
willingness of the main actors to participate (section 4.1 and 4.2) and
on the supply reliability in Flanders (section 4.3), if a CSPP would have
been operational from 2003 onwards. Due to stochasticity, the model is
not suited to forecast exact market behavior of individual agents. The
results should, therefore, be interpreted in light of general market dy-
namics. For all statistical signiﬁcance tests, we used a Mann-Whitney U
test.
4.1. Farmers: willingness and actual participation
Fig. 6 shows, for each scenario, the predicted farmers' willingness to
participate in the corn stover value chain, expressed as the share of
farmers' willing to participate(left), and farmers' participation ex-
pressed as the share that would have actually participated (right), be-
tween 2003 and 2014.
Overall, farmers' willingness follows the same trend for the four
actor coordination scenarios. In each scenario, it would have started at
a relatively high level (48%), to drop signiﬁcantly in 2004 to even 0%
for the direct sale and request-for-purchase scenarios and to 4% for the
cooperative scenarios, and to eventually increase again in 2007 (to
Fig. 5. Schematic overview of the actor coordination scenarios. The CSPP is represented as a factory, the CHs as tractors and the farmers as persons. Two-sided arrows represent
negotiation processes. Circled agents are part of a cooperative.
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41%, 45%, 50% and 51% for the direct sale, request-for-purchase,
supply cooperative and bioprocessing cooperative scenarios respec-
tively). For the direct-sale and request-for-purchase scenarios, the pre-
dicted farmers' willingness would have dropped again to almost 0%
from 2009 to 2012. For the cooperative scenarios, this level would have
stayed between 8% and 10%. There would be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in farmers' willingness between the direct sale and request-for-purchase
scenarios between 2009 and 2013. For the same period, farmers' will-
ingness would have been slightly, but signiﬁcantly (p < .05), higher in
the bioprocessing cooperative scenario than in the supply cooperative
scenario. These ﬂuctuations can be explained by looking at the prices of
the other crops grown by the farmers (Fig. 3).
These ﬂuctuations can be explained by looking at the prices of the
other crops grown by the farmers (Fig. 3). These prices determine the
actual gross margin and the expected revenue of the farmers. Our re-
sults show that in general, farmers follow a deliberation behavior and to
a lesser extent a social comparison behavior. Fewer farmers follow a
repetition behavior, and almost no farmers follow an imitation beha-
vior. In 2009, the prices of wheat, potato and grain were relatively low.
Having a lower revenue than the expected revenue, farmers become
uncertain about their decisions and more farmers switch to a social
comparison behavior, at the cost of farmers with repetition behavior. As
such, large shifts in cropping plan occur. Over the following years,
prices of wheat and permanent grassland are relatively high. As a result,
more farmers grow these crops instead of corn. Consequently, fewer
farmers would have shown interest in participating in the corn stover
value chain.
The farmers' participation shows a rather unstable pattern in both
the direct sale and request-for-purchase scenarios and follows largely
the same trend as farmers' willingness. For the request-for-purchase
scenario, this pattern is most pronounced. The cooperative scenarios
show a more gradual increase in farmers' participation. Starting from
2008, farmers' participation in the bioprocessing cooperative would
have been slightly, but signiﬁcantly (p < .05), higher than in the
supply cooperative scenario.
Remarkably, for all scenarios, the predicted farmers' willingness
would be most often larger than farmers' participation. This is explained
by the behavior of the CHs, discussed in the next section.
4.2. Custom harvesters' participation
The left pane of Fig. 7 shows the predicted custom harvesters' par-
ticipation, expressed as the share of CHs owning a single-pass harvester.
Custom harvesters' participation remains limited to 25% for the direct
sale and supply cooperative scenarios and 27% for the bioprocessing
cooperative scenario. In the request-for-purchase scenario, up to 34% of
the CHs would have bought a single-pass harvester by 2014. The
comparison of Fig. 7 with Fig. 6 indicates that the number of single-pass
harvesters, each able to harvest 300 ha per year, as explained in section
3, limits farmers' participation. For example, in 2007 of the biopro-
cessing scenario, 51% of the farmers would have been willing to par-
ticipate, which would result in a corn stover harvesting area of about
38,516 ha. The graph shows that only 22% of the CHs would own a
single-pass harvester in 2007, which makes a total harvest area of only
11,880 ha. Indeed, in this year and scenario, 12% of the farmers actu-
ally participate in the corn stover value chain, which corresponds to an
area of 9063 ha of corn planted for harvest of the grain and stover. The
diﬀerence between the maximal possible surface and the actual surface
harvested is explained by limitations in transportation distance, and
diﬀerences in yield between diﬀerent agro-ecological zones, as well as
diﬀerences in coordination of the actors, which is further discussed in
section 5. This result demonstrates the key position of the CHs in the
corn stover value chain: a deﬁcit in single-pass harvesters limits
farmers' participation in the value chain. Indeed, in the request-for-
purchase scenario, the CH has a central position in the value chain, and
a coordinating role, leading to an increased number of CHs owning a
single-pass harvester.
Due to their central position, however, CHs are also very vulnerable
to changes in the market. Because the farmers' willingness and parti-
cipation is dynamic, CHs face a large risk not to be able to fully use their
equipment at certain points in time. This overcapacity is presented in
the right pane of Fig. 7, showing the predicted number of single-pass
harvesters in surplus given the surface of corn planted for the harvest of
both the grain and the stover. With regard to the direct sale scenario,
and even more for the request-for-purchase scenario, we observe a large
surplus of up to 59 single-pass harvesters between 2008 and 2014. In
these years, many CHs would not have been able to use their equipment
to the full extent or even not at all and their investment would not have
been proﬁtable. In the supply cooperative and bioprocessing co-
operative scenarios the surplus remains limited to a maximum of 18
single-pass harvesters. If farmers' participation rate is more stable, as in
the cooperative scenarios, the CHs would have been more likely to use
their equipment every year, at least to harvest some hectares.
4.3. Supply reliability
Fig. 8 shows the predicted corn stover volume purchased by the
CSPP as a percentage of the maximum processing capacity of the plant
(250,000Mg dry basis). In fact, this graph illustrates the accumulation
of the decisions of both the farmers and the CHs whether or not to
Fig. 6. Left: Farmers' wiliness to participate in the corn stover value chain (%) and right: Farmers' participation in the corn stover value chain (%) for the four scenarios. The error bars and
the grey ribbon represent the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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participate in the corn stover value chain, and how supply reliability is
inﬂuenced by actors' willingness to participate and coordination of
these actors. The direct sale scenario would have shown a rather ﬂuc-
tuating trend, in which supplies would have raised up to about 18% and
12% in 2007 and 2013 respectively, but also would have dropped be-
tween 2009 and 2012. The corn stover supply in the request-for-pur-
chase scenario would have shown a similar trend, only the ﬂuctuations
would be more pronounced with supply peaks of up to 43% and 29% in
2007 and 2013 respectively. These patterns are in accordance to the
predicted farmers' participation (Fig. 6). The supply cooperative and
bioprocessing cooperative scenarios would have shown signiﬁcantly
smaller ﬂuctuations in the corn stover supply. In the supply cooperative
scenario, the purchased volumes would have ﬂuctuated between 12%
and 19%. For the bioprocessing cooperative scenario, these volumes
would be higher and would ﬂuctuate between 17% and 25%. Finally,
for all scenarios, we observe that if a CSPP would have been operational
in 2003, the plant could never have acquired the necessary corn stover
volumes to operate at full capacity. Indeed, the volumes purchased
would have ﬂuctuated around 20%, which means that the CSPP could
only have acquired a reliable supply of about 50,000Mg dry basis.
Fig. 7. Left: Custom harvesters' participation, expressed as the CHs owning a single-pass harvester for the four scenarios (%). Right: Number of single-pass harvesters for the four
scenarios. The error bars and the grey ribbon represent the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Fig. 8. Volume of corn stover purchased by the CSPP as a percentage of the maximum processing capacity for the four scenarios. The error bars and the grey ribbon represent the 95%
conﬁdence interval.
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5. Discussion
The model results allow us to gain insight into how the three aspects
(actors' willingness, actors' coordination and supply reliability) help in
reaching the goal of ensuring a continuous agricultural residue supply.
Furthermore, they reveal the complex interplay between these factors.
Our results provide both insights for the speciﬁc case of a corn stover
value chain in Flanders, or similar regions, but also more general in-
sights valuable for economic actors interested in the much needed de-
velopment of agricultural residue value chains. Therefore, below, we
present a more elaborate discussion of the model results in a more
general context (section 5.1), and shortly discuss the implications of our
results for Flanders or a similar region (section 5.2). Finally, we also
discuss the model assumptions (section 5.4) and possible venues for
further research (section 5.4).
5.1. General research implications
Our results allowed us to reﬁne Fig. 1, resulting in Fig. 9. Besides the
three inﬂuencing factors identiﬁed from literature, in this ﬁgure, we
added two additional factors, namely economic context and actors'
participation. Furthermore, we schematically represent their complex
interplay. This will be further discussed in the following sections.
5.1.1. Actors' willingness and participation
As mentioned before, and as shown in Fig. 1, the economic actors'
willingness to participate in agricultural residue value chains was
identiﬁed as one of the main aspects of establishing a continuous bio-
mass supply to large-scale processing plants [14]. Hence, several au-
thors have done research on the actors' willingness to participate in new
biomass value chains, and more particularly on the willingness of the
producers to supply biomass to a processing plant (e.g. Refs.
[16,68,69]). In general, these studies take a static approach and
therefore provide a snapshot of the producers' willingness at a certain
point in time.
While existing willingness research was crucial to get a ﬁrst insight
in assessing the potential biomass supply to a large-scale processing
plant, the case-study shows that these studies are only a ﬁrst step, and a
one-on-one relationship is unlikely for two reasons.
First, we demonstrated that producers' willingness cannot be re-
garded as a static concept, but can be highly dynamic and dependent on
other economic factors, including prices of other crops. Indeed, litera-
ture has shown that an uncertain business climate could change the
outcome of the survey results [16]. As such, potential investors in
agricultural residue value chains should be aware of these dynamics in
producers' willingness. In future research, it might therefore be useful
to take a more dynamic modelling approach, or to use panel survey data
in order to show how changing economic conditions interplay with
farmers' willingness.
Second, we demonstrated that producers' willingness is not suﬃ-
cient as explaining factor to understand how a continuous biomass
supply can be ensured. Indeed, our results showed that in fact it is
farmers' actual participation that inﬂuences the agricultural residue
supply. Therefore, investors in new agricultural biomass value chains
should not be biased by data on producers willingness only, but should
instead critically reﬂect whether the necessary preconditions were
created for these interested producers to be able to actually participate.
As such, it is important to reﬂect on the willingness of all possible
stakeholders in the value chain.
5.1.2. Inﬂuence of actors' coordination on actors' willingness, actors'
participation and supply reliability
As discussed in the previous section, actors' willingness is not suf-
ﬁcient to assess the potential biomass supply to a processor, but actual
participation is of main importance. In the case-study, actors' partici-
pation is not only inﬂuenced by their willingness, but also by the actors'
coordination. A clear example of this can be found when we compare
the results of the direct sale and the request-for-purchase scenario.
While we could not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the farmers'
willingness for these scenarios, we observe that the farmers' participa-
tion largely deviates, with large peaks in the request-for-purchase sce-
nario and more moderate peaks in the direct sale scenario. We also
observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the custom harvesters' participation
for these two scenarios. As such, we ﬁnd that the actors' coordination
with the custom harvester in a central position, allows for a better co-
ordination and alignment of the diﬀerent actors in the value chain.
However, the largely ﬂuctuating farmers' willingness resulting from
changes in economic context, leads to a higher chance of a potential
mismatch between farmers' willingness and CHs who have invested in a
single-pass harvester. Therefore, the case-study shows the CH's key
position, but at the same time very vulnerable position, in the corn
stover value chain. In the literature, their role is often neglected. When
CHs are an intrinsic part of the agricultural system, one should re-
cognize their central position and make signiﬁcant eﬀort to involve
them from the start when developing new agricultural residue value
chains [70]. In other regions, where farmers are not used to working
with CHs, investors should be aware that the CHs' role might expand
over time, as the equipment becomes more and more specialized and
capital intensive [71].
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that actors' coordination also inﬂuences
supply reliability, and through this aspect, indirectly inﬂuences the
stability of the biomass supply, rather than having a direct inﬂuence.
The main characteristic in the direct sale and request-for-purchase
scenario is that the farmers can easily enter and exit the market
Fig. 9. Inﬂuencing factors and their interactions
determining a continuous supply of agricultural
residues.
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whenever they want [31], which is also reﬂected in the case-study,
showing a large ﬂuctuation in the farmers' participation. This can be
perceived as an advantage for the farmers, but when agents need to
make large investments, such as the CHs and the CSPP, the easy entry
and exit can also be perceived as a major threat for these agents, as it
exposes them to an unstable biomass supply [70,72]. Famers' engage-
ment in the market may suddenly drop, leaving the CHs with an ex-
pensive single-pass harvester that cannot be used, and the CSPP with an
unstable corn stover supply. Therefore, under these coordination sce-
narios, investments are too risky. Another disadvantage of a direct sale
coordination scenario is that the CSPP needs to manage separate con-
tracts with hundreds of farmers. Managing such a large number of
contracts is often found undesirable by processors [31]. As such, we can
conclude that a direct sale and request-for-purchase coordination sce-
nario are not the most favorable ways to organize the value chain.
The two cooperative actor coordination scenarios have the ad-
vantage of a more equal distribution of both proﬁt and risks between
the actors in the value chain [31]. In our results, this is reﬂected by the
higher farmers' willingness under these actor coordination scenarios.
Additionally, these coordination types give their members a sense of
ownership and proﬁt motivation [73]. However, we were not able to
take these two features explicitly into account in the model. Overall, we
found that the cooperative actor coordination scenarios give a more
stable, and reliable farmers' willingness and participation. This is ben-
eﬁcial, both for the custom harvesters, as a mismatch between the
farmers' participation and the number of machines is largely avoided,
and for the processor, as the agricultural residue supply is found to be
far more stable.
5.2. Research implications for Flanders or similar regions
With regard to the case-study, the development of a corn stover
value chain in Flanders, we can also learn some interesting lessons.
Firstly, irrespectively of the simulated actor coordination scenario, we
found that a large-scale breakthrough of the simulated CSPP only based
on corn stover would have been unlikely between 2003 and 2014.
Although the corn stover supply in the request-for-purchase scenario
reached almost half of the operation capacity at certain points in time, a
corn stover supply at this level could not be maintained over a longer
period. For the two cooperative coordination scenarios, the CSPP op-
eration capacity ﬂuctuates around 20% of its maximum. In a region
such as Flanders, with relatively small scale farmers and ﬁelds, several
options exists: to use the corn stover in smaller scale processes, pro-
ducing high value products; to ensure a continuous supply by com-
plementing the corn stover supply with for example wheat straw, wood
chips or miscanthus.
5.3. Study limitations
In order to improve conﬁdence in model-based conclusions, it is
necessary to assess how model assumptions and parameters alter the
results and policy decisions [74]. On one hand, we might underestimate
the development for several reasons. We assumed that stover can only
be harvested from maize speciﬁcally sown for this purpose. In practice,
farmers could also decide to harvest the stover of silage maize when the
price incentive is large enough. Also the land availability for each
farmer can increase or decrease over time. We excluded certain eco-
nomic parameters such as oil prices. A rise in oil prices may, for ex-
ample, induce higher prices for bio-based products and therefore foster
the implementation of the bio-economy. Additionally, we only con-
sidered corn stover produced within Flanders and did not consider any
import from other regions or countries. This assumption can be justiﬁed
by the fact that stakeholders indicated that due to the low corn stover
density, transportation of this biomass over longer distances than
100 km is not likely to be economically viable. On the other hand, we
might overestimate the stover supply since we did not take into account
inter-year variability of corn stover yields, discussed by Ref. [74], nor
the risk of not being able to harvest the corn stover due to extreme wet
weather conditions. Following [66], we assumed the uncertainty values
and aspiration levels to have an average value of 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.17 for the farmers and the CHs. Nonetheless, a sensitivity
analysis, of which the results are discussed in the supplemental web
enabled material, indicated that our main conclusions are still valid in
case of certain parameter changes, including the uncertainty values and
the aspiration levels. Finally, we did not take into account all possible
market mechanisms and actor coordination scenarios, e.g. long-term
contracts. Long-term contracts are however not likely to be the best
option in case of cellulosic sugar production, as this would signiﬁcantly
increase the CSPP's capital requirements compared to cooperative
models [73], and because it may be diﬃcult to convince farmers to sign
such contracts. The selection of actor coordination scenarios is based on
[31] and the model detail, was guided by the combination of model
complexity to approximate reality, feasibility of parameter estimation
and output interpretability. In addition, the model was constructed, not
with the aim of producing individual-level results, but rather to gain
insights in the mechanisms that inﬂuence and contribute to a con-
tinuous agricultural residue supply.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we demonstrated how actors' willingness, actors'
coordination and supply reliability inﬂuence the stability of agricultural
residue supply to a large-scale processor. To this framework, we added
actors' participation as a fourth inﬂuencing factor. Finally, we demon-
strated the dynamic characteristic of these four aspects. This dynamic
character is driven by the ﬁfth factor, namely economic context.
Furthermore, we revealed a complex interplay between these ﬁve fac-
tors and how they contribute to the goal of ensuring a continuous
supply of biomass.
These results were deducted from an ABM of a corn stover value
chain in Flanders. Our simulations showed that under none of the
considered governance structure scenarios suﬃcient stover is traded for
a CSPP to be able to depend only on corn stover as a feedstock. This is
due to a limited number of single-pass harvesters available on the
market to harvest the corn stover, limiting the number of farmers able
to participate in the corn stover value chain. As such, our ﬁndings de-
monstrate the central role of custom harvesters in the corn stover value
chain. Therefore, we advocate not to forget these crucial stakeholders in
future analyses. Furthermore, the ABM simulation results showed that
in case of a direct sale or request-for-purchase scenario, the market
shows a rather unstable supply for corn stover. Conversely, cooperative
scenarios show a more stable supply. As the supply in the bioprocessing
cooperative scenario was signiﬁcantly higher than in the supply co-
operative scenario, this coordination scenario appears to be the most
beneﬁcial for the corn stover value chain.
Finally, the mixed-method approach was found to be useful to
analyse the development of a complex system, such as the agricultural
residue value chain. Although many assumptions are needed at various
levels of the system, the results provide useful insights in the diﬀerent
factors that contribute to the goal of ensuring a continuous feedstock
supply. Understanding these factors and their complex interplay is
crucial to guide the successful future development of agricultural re-
sidue value chains.
For further research, we invite other researchers to test our frame-
work to other case studies, and/or using other survey techniques, in-
cluding panel survey data, in order to conﬁrm and/or complement our
ﬁndings.
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